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Abstract
We present a model in which two of the most important features of the long-run growth
process are reconciled: the massive changes in the structure of production and employ-
ment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. We assume that households expand their
consumption along a hierarchy of needs and !rms introduce continuously new products.
In equilibrium industries with an expanding and those with a declining employment share
co-exist, and each such industry goes (or has already gone) through a cycle of take-o!,
maturity, and stagnation. Nonetheless macroeconomic aggregates grow pari passu at a
constant rate.
JEL classication: O40, O11, O31, L16, D91
Keywords: Kaldor facts, balanced growth, structural change, innovation, hierarchic pref-
erences, demand externalities, multiple equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The process of development is characterized by fundamental changes in the structure of pro-
duction and employment. The emergence of new and the decline of old industries has led to a
dramatic reallocation of labor between sectors of production in historical perspective.1 Despite
these large structural changes, the long-term growth process turns out remarkably stable in
the aggregate. As mentioned by Kaldor (1961) in his famous stylized facts, a situation where
growth rate, interest rate, capital output ratio, and labor share are constant over time is a
reasonable approximation of the long-run growth experience of a modern economy.
In this paper we present a model that accounts both for structural change and for the
Kaldor facts. On the one hand, industries with a growing share in aggregate production co-
exist with declining industries, and each such industry is going (or has already gone) through
a cycle of take-o!, maturity, and stagnation. Hence there is continuous structural change. On
the other hand, our model features a situation where all macroeconomic aggregates grow at
the same constant rate, and where the interest rate and the labor share are constant over time.
Thus, our model meets Kaldor’s criteria. In contrast, standard theories of economic growth
have been predominantly concerned with models that exhibit a ’balanced’ growth path and
have almost entirely ignored the issue of structural change.2
Generally speaking, changes in the structure of production and employment result either
from di!erences in productivity growth or from di!erences in the growth of product demand
across sectors. In this paper, we focus on the demand side and abstract from technological
di!erences across sectors. Thus the driving force behind structural changes are di!erences in
the income elasticities of demand across sectors.
The basic idea of our analysis is that households expand their consumption along a hier-
archy of needs. When the basic needs are saturated, consumers move on to more advanced
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needs. As incomes grow, more and more goods and services enter the consumption bundle,
and more and more wants can be satis!ed. The empirical motivation for the assumption of a
hierarchy structure of preferences is Engel’s law, one of the most robust empirical regularities
in economics (Houthakker, 1987). Engel (1857) himself saw the implications of this law for
economic development very clearly: a declining relative demand for food would inevitably de-
crease the share of output and employment in the agricultural sector, and would provide the
resources for the emergence of new industries.
The supply side of our model has a simple structure. We study a situation where growth
is endogenous and driven by industrial R&D. There are interindustry spillovers of knowledge,
so innovative activities in one sector add to the economy-wide stock of knowledge and increase
productivity in all other sectors. The assumption of economy-wide spillover e!ects rules out
sector-speci!c technical progress, the second possible source of structural change. The main
reason why we disregard uneven technical change is to keep the model tractable and to con-
centrate on the role of demand. The second reason is that, unlike on the demand side, it is less
clear on the supply side how the conditions in expanding relative to stagnating sectors change
over time.3
The equilibrium outcome of our model has the following features. First, the dynamic equi-
librium is characterized by a situation of continuous structural change. At each date, there
co-exist goods that have a high income elasticity (luxuries) with goods that have a low income
elasticity (necessities). And over time each good starts o! as a luxury with a high income
elasticity and ends up as a necessity with a low income elasticity. In this sense, each sector
goes through the same cycle of take-o!, maturity, and stagnation. Hence the equilibrium is
characterized by non-linear Engel-curves due to the non-homotheticity of hierarchic prefer-
ences.
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Second, the dynamic equilibrium meets Kaldor’s criteria. Prima facie reconciling structural
change and non-linear Engel-curves with the Kaldor facts seems to be a di"cult task. What
is the crucial assumption that makes this possible? Necessary conditions for a steady growth
path are a constant interest rate on the supply side and a constant elasticity of intertemporal
substitution on the preference side. With many goods and a constant interest rate, steady
growth is possible if the optimal growth rate of total consumption expenditures is constant over
time. The demand and expenditure levels of the various products, however, !""# !$% &'(!)"
*! +,$+$,%*$! -*%' %$%(. "/+"!#*%0,"1. It is exactly this pattern that our model generates. With
our model of hierarchic preferences, it turns out that the constancy of the optimal growth rate
of consumption expenditures depends critically on a function that characterizes the ’steepness’
of the hierarchy of needs, that is the willingsness of consumers to move from goods that satisfy
needs of higher priority towards goods that satisfy needs of lower priority.
Third, in our model there is an interesting two-way causality between technological progress
and the incentives for innovators. On the one hand, the aggregate growth rate is endogenously
determined by industrial R&D due to our assumptions regarding productivity improvements.
On the other hand, the incentives for innovators depend crucially on the economy-wide growth
rate, because all sectors have a positive (albeit non-unitary) income elasticity of demand.
This dynamic complementarity between aggregate and sectoral dynamics may give rise to of
multiple equilibria. Optimistic (pessimistic) expectations of a high (low) growth rate provide
an incentive for a high (low) level of innovative activities that makes expectations come true.
Fourth, the dynamic equilibrium may be characterized by a situation where consumers
cannot a!ord all products that are available on the market. In particular, this means that the
non-negativity constraints for the most luxurious (= brand-new) products are binding. For
this reason innovators have a ’waiting time’ until consumers are rich enough to purchase a new
product. Firms may nevertheless incur the R&D costs to get a patent and to prevent potential
competitors conquering the market.
Finally, hierarchic preferences imply that incumbent !rms have increasing market power
as the price elasticities of demand decrease during the product cycle. Rising incomes lead to a
higher willingness to pay and hence to higher mark-ups. The growing mark-ups imply strong
static price distortions and the socially optimal patent policy is characterized by a !nite patent
length.
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As mentioned above the previous literature has largely ignored to analyze the simultaneity
of structural change and steady growth. To our knowledge, the only paper that explicitely
addresses this question is the one by Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001). They show in the
context of a three-goods economy that a ’generalized’ balanced growth path is only possible
if technology and taste parameters satisfy a certain knife-edge condition. No such link is
necessary in our model. In the present set-up new goods are continuously introduced, each of
which starts o! as a luxury with a high income elasticity and ends up as a necessity with a
low income elasticity. Moreover, in Kongsamut et al. (2001) productivity growth is exogenous
whereas in our model innovations play a central role and interesting interactions between
aggregate and sectoral dynamics arise.4
There are several other papers that are related to the present analysis. In Matsuyama
(2002) the structure of preferences is similar in spirit to our framework as the various goods
are ranked according to priority. In equilibrium, consumer goods industries take o! one after
another, and new goods are initially luxuries and !nally become necessities. Stokey (1988)
also analyzes a growth model in which changes in the sectoral structure occur as a result of
non-homothetic preferences. Consumers value new goods because they have more character-
istics, while old goods with less characteristics disappear. Neither of these papers focuses
on the consistency of the changing sectoral structure with the Kaldor facts. Moreover, those
papers assume a learning-by-doing mechanism, while in the present paper growth is driven
by innovations. Thus, the dynamic demand externalities in our model do not show up there.
A further related paper is Laitner (2001) who analyzes changes in the measured savings rate
that occur during the process of growth and structural change. Contrary to our model, pro-
ductivity growth is exogenous and the process of structural change is modeled in a two-sector
framework.5
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general set-up of the model,
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solves the static problems of consumers and !rms, and discusses the resulting structure of
demand and prices in the static equilibrium. In Section 3 we present our assumptions on
technology, the labor market, and the determinants of aggregate savings. Section 4 discusses
the equilibrium growth path and describes the patterns of structural changes that occur along
this path. Section 5 contains a discussion of multiple equilibria and Section 6 applies the model
to optimal patent policy. Section 7 summarizes the results and discusses possible extensions.
2 The Static Equilibrium
2.1 Preferences and consumer demand
Consider a representative agent economy with in!nitely many potentially produceable goods
ranked by an index i. We study the structure of consumption that is generated by preferences
of the form
u (!c(i)") =
! "
0
!(i) v(c(i)) di
where v(c(i)) is an indicator for the utility derived from consuming good i in quantity c. The
’baseline’ utility v(c(i)) satis!es the usual assumptions v" > 0 and v"" < 0; and the ’hierarchy’
function !(i) is monotonically decreasing in i, !"(i) < 0, hence low-i goods get a higher weight
than high-i goods.
A meaningful speci!cation of hierarchic preferences has to take account of two facts. First,
some goods may not be consumed because the consumer cannot a!ord them. This implies
that preferences must be such that the !$!2!")(%*3*%4 &$!1%,(*!%1 5(4 6"&$5" 6*!#*!) and
Engel-curves for the various goods are non-linear. Formally, binding non-negativity constraints
require that the marginal utility of consuming good i in quantitiy zero, !(i)v"(0) is !nite for all
i > 0. If marginal utility at quantity zero were in!nitely large, it would always be optimal to
consume a (small) positive amount even when prices are very high and/or the budget is very
low.6
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Second, Engels’ law implies that (##*%*$!(. income is spent primarily on low-priority goods
(high income elasticity). This feature is caught by the formulation that the utility of consump-
tion of di!erent goods di!ers only in the factor !(i). As the hierarchy function !(i) is decreasing
in i the marginal utility of a high priority good (low i) falls quickly. Optimal consumer be-
havior implies that additional income is spent primarily on the low-priority goods with slowly
falling marginal utilities.
To keep the analysis tractable we make two assumptions concerning the functional forms of
the weighting function !(i) and the baseline utility v(c(i)). First we assume that the weighting
function is a power function !(i) = i#! with " ! (0, 1). It will turn out below that it is exactly
this assumption which will allow us to study an equilibrium growth path that meets the Kaldor
facts. Second, we assume that the baseline utility is quadratic, v(c(i)) = 12 [s
2 " (s " c(i))2].
This allows us to !nd explicit solutions both for the optimal quantities consumed by the
households and for the pro!t-maximizing prices charged by !rms. At the same time this
speci!cation features the possibility that non-negativity constraints may become binding, as
marginal utility at quantity zero is !nite, !(i)v"(0) = i#! 12s
2 <# for all goods i > 0.
With these assumptions, we can now speci!y the objective function of the consumer’s static
maximization problem. Assume that only goods with high priority i ! [0, N ] are available on
the market, whereas all i > N have not yet been invented. In that case the consumers’ objective
function is7
u(!c(i)") =
! "
0
i#!
1
2
[s2 " (s" c(i))2] di. (1)
which will be maximized subject to the budget constraint
" N
0 p(i)c(i)di = E and the non-
negativity constraints c(i) $ 0 for all i. The optimality conditions require that the above
constraints and the !rst order conditions
c (i)
#
i#!(s" c(i))" #p(i)$ = 0 %i (2)
i#!(s" c(i))" #p(i) & 0 %i.
7v(c(i__ f 1
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be satis!ed, where # denotes the Lagrangian multiplier.
2.2 Prices
We assume there are constant marginal cost in production, equal for all goods, and we normalize
these marginal costs to unity. Goods i ! [0, aN ] are supplied on competitive markets and
goods i ! (aN,N ] are supplied by monopolistic !rms. This means that high priority (low-i)
goods are supplied by competitive producers and low priority (high-i) goods are supplied by
monopolists.8
The prices for goods in the interval i ! [0, aN ] are equal to marginal costs which are
unity. Determining the prices for the goods i ! (aN,N ] is less trivial but straightforward.
The market demand function is given by the representative household’s optimality condi-
tions (2). The price that the monopolist charges maximizes the objective function $(p(i)) =
[p(i)" 1] [max (0, s" i!p(i)#)] . The solution is given by
p(i) = max
%
1,
s+ i!#
2i!#
&
for i ! (aN,N ] . (3)
2.3 Equilibrium composition of demand and the structure of prices
We can now characterize the composition of demand and the structure of prices in the static
equilibrium, given the representative agent’s budget E and the measure of available goods N .
This will be done separately for the two scenarios that can occur in equilibrium. In the !rst
case, the consumer cannot a!ord all supplied goods because the non-negativity constraints
for low-priority goods become binding. In the second case, the consumer is rich enough to
purchase all goods that are supplied on the market. We discuss these two cases in turn. (The
conditions under which the two respective regimes occur are studied in Section 4 below.)
When the consumer does not purchase all available goods, the measure of products con-
sumed in positive amounts falls short of the measure of available goodsN . If good i is consumed
in positive amounts and supplied at the monopoly price, we know from (2) and (3) that the
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consumed quantity equals c(i) = 12 (s" i!#) . The equilibrium demand is decreasing in i which
means that the optimal quantity of low-priority goods is smaller. It also means that there is a
good, call it n, such that for goods i > n the optimal level of demand is zero and all goods i < n
are consumed in positive amounts. It turns out convenient to express the endogenous variables
c(i) and p(i) in terms of the endogenous variable n rather than #. From c(n) = 12 (s" n!#) = 0
it is straightforward to calculate # = sn" . Substituting this into equations (2) and (3) we get
the equilibrium composition of demand, and the equilibrium structure of prices
c(i) =
!"""#""$
s
#
1" ' in(!$ , i ! [0, aN ]
s
2
#
1" ' in(!$ , i ! (aN, n]
0, i ! (n,N ]
(4)
and
p(i) =
!""#""$
1, i ! [0, aN ]
1
2
#
1 +
'
n
i
(!$
, i ! (aN, n]
1, i ! (n,N ] .
(5)
According to equations (4) and (5), what matters for prices and quantities is the ,".(%*3"
+$1*%*$! in the hierarchy of needs, i/n. We also see that the ’steeper’ the hierarchy (the higher
is ") the more important is the relative position. The above expressions for p(i) and c(i)
are determined for a given measure of consumed goods n. However, n itself is an endogenous
variable. To get the optimal value of n we substitute equations (4) and (5) into the budget
constraint to get
E =
! n
0
p(i)c(i)di = sn
)
aN
n
" 1
4
*
3(aNn )
1+! + 1
1 + "
" 1" (
aN
n )
1#!
1" "
+,
. (6)
This equation implicitely de!nes the number of consumed goods n as a function of expenditures
E, available goods N , and other parameters of the model.9 In particular, we note that E and
N are exogenous from the point of view of the consumer. Moreover, we see from the above
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equation that n is homogenous of degree one in E and N : when E and N increase by some
factor, the equilibrium value of n increases by the same factor.
Now consider the alternative scenario that the consumer chooses to consume all available
goods in positive amounts. Obviously, this is the case if c(N) = 12 (s"N!#) > 0. Also here
it is convenient to replace #. However, we cannot express # in terms of the optimal bundle of
consumed goods n which is trivially determined by the number of available goods N. Instead
we express # in terms of the price of the good that has least priority in consumption, that is
by the endogenous variable p(N) ' p. From (3) it is straightforward to express the marginal
utility of income as # = sN"(2p#1) . The same expression (3) can be used to express the monopoly
prices for the goods i ! (aN,N ] in terms of p as p(i) = 12 [1 +
'
N
i
(!
(2p" 1)]. The structure of
prices and the equilibrium composition of demand can now be expressed as
c(i) =
!#$ s[1"
'
i
N
(! 1
2p#1 ] i ! [0, aN ]
s
2 [1"
'
i
N
(! 1
2p#1 ], i ! (aN,N ]
(4’)
and
p(i) =
!#$ 1, i ! [0, aN ]1
2 [1 +
'
N
i
(!
(2p" 1)], i ! (aN,N ].
(5’)
Note that, in equilibrium, a higher p means higher prices for all goods and this goes hand
in hand with higher equilibrium consumption for all goods. The reason for this apparently
strange result is that the equilibrium depends crucially on the consumer’s budget E relative
to the measure of supplied goods N. If E is large relative to N , there is high demand for each
good which means that monopolists can charge high prices.
The variables c(i) and p(i) are determined by the endogenous variable p, the pro!t-
maximizing price chosen by the monopolist who supplies the good N . Just like before, the
equilibrium depends on the consumer’s budget E, the measure of available goods N, and other
parameters of the model. To see the relationship between p, E, and N, we insert equations
(4’) and (5’) into the consumer’s budget constraint
E =
! N
0
p(i)c(i)di = sN
%
a" 1
4
-
3a1+! + 1
(1 + ") (2p" 1) " (2p" 1)
1" a1#!
1" "
.&
(6’)
This expression implicitely de!nes p as a function of E, N, and other parameters of the model.
We observe that p is homogenous of degree zero in E and N : when E and N grow pari passu,
p remains unchanged.
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3 The Dynamics of the Economy
3.1 Technical Progress and the Resource Constraint
To keep things simple we assume that labor is the only production factor. Production requires
a !xed (’innovation’ or ’research’) input of F˜ (t) units of labor, and a variable labor input
of b˜(t) per unit of output (t denotes a continuous time index). Denoting by w(t) the wage
rate, we have innovation costs w(t)F˜ (t) and marginal costs of production w(t)b˜(t). We assume
b˜(t) = bA(t) and F˜ (t) =
F
A(t) , where A(t) is the aggregate knowledge stock, and F, b > 0
are exogenous parameters. These assumptions imply that productivity growth, an increase
in A(t), is uniform across sectors and also across activities. Assuming uniform productivity
growth across +,$#0&%1 makes sure that all heterogeneity comes from the demand side which
is the focus of our analysis. Assuming uniform productivity growth across (production and
research) (&%*3*%*"1 is important for the existence of a constant growth path. Along this path
wages grow with productivity so that marginal production costs w(t)b(t) and innovation costs
w(t)F (t) are constant over time. In what follows we take marginal cost as the numeraire, hence
w(t)b(t) = 1 for all t.
In accordance with much of the endogenous growth literature we assume that the aggregate
knowledge stock is proxied by the amount of previous innovations activities. These consist of
the measure of goods that are actually available on the market, so we have A(t) = N(t) and
b˜(t) = bN(t) and F˜ (t) =
F
N(t) .
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The labor force is normalized to 1 and, in equilibrium, there is full employment. At date t,
"N(t) new goods are introduced and the necessary employment level to perform the innovation
input is "N(t) FN(t) . The necessary employment level to produce the demanded consumers goods
10eo(e (/5( o-& 5''-34(#on on PnoL6eTRe '4#66o$e&' T#!e&' +&o3 (/e '(5nT5&T i6o$e=+o&=$5&#e()i 3oTe6 (Z&o''=
35n 5nT <e6435n0 9JJG_M 1n (/5( 3oTe6 4&oT-.(#$#() R&oL' on6) #n &e'e5&./ \-( no( #n 4&oT-.(#onM 1n (/e
/#e&5&./#.56 3oTe6 #n'(e5T (/e&e /5' (o \e (e./n#.56 4&oR&e'' o(/e&L#'e #nno$5(#on' .o3e' (o 5 /56( \e.5-'e .on=
'-3e&' 5&e no( L#66#nR (o &eT-.e .on'-34(#on on /#R/=4&#o&#() RooT' #+ neL RooT' .o3e 56onRM <en.e L#(/o-(
(e./n#.56 4&oR&e'' #n 4&oT-.(#on0 'oone& o& 65(e& (/e L/o6e 65\o& +o&.e L#66 \e e346o)eT (o '5(#'+) (/e Te35nT
o+ .on'-3e&' on (/e 56&e5T) eI#'(#nR RooT'M V-& 5''-34(#on .5n \e j-'(#!eT -'#nR (/e 5&R-3en( o+ ]o-nR
(9JJE_B 1+ (/e #n$en(#on o+ 5 neL RooT i 6e5T' 5' 5 \)=4&oT-.( (o (/e T#'.o$e&) o+ 5 neL #n(e&3eT#5(e #n4-( 5nT
#+ (/e !n56 RooT' 5&e 4&oT-.eT \) .o3\#n#nR (/e'e #n4-(' -'#nR 5 .on'(5n( &e(-&n' (o '.56e ;2X (e./no6oR)0 (/e
4&oT-.(#$#() o+ (/e o-(4-( 'e.(o& &#'e' 6#ne5&6) #n (/e n-3\e& o+ (/e'e #n4-('M
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is bN(t)
" n(t)
0 c(i, t)di. Thus with full employment of the labor resources we have
1 =
"N(t)
N(t)
F +
b
N(t)
! n(t)
0
c(i, t)di. (7)
3.2 The Innovation Process
Innovations occur because !rms are granted patents and earn pro!ts as long as their market
is protected from competitors. The value of an innovation that occurs at date t, #(t), equals
the present value of the pro!t #ow that accrues to the innovating !rm. This #ow starts at the
date when consumers begin to purchase this product and ends when patents have expired. We
denote the #ow pro!t at date % of the date-t innovator (the !rm which produces good N(t))
by $(N(t), %) = [p(N(t), %)" 1] c(N(t), %).
When consumers purchase all available varieties n = N the date-t innovator earns positive
pro!ts right from the start, that is throughout the interval [t, t + $] where the exogenous
policy parameter $ denotes the duration of the patent. When consumers cannot a!ord all
available varieties n < N, the innovator has initially no demand. Consumers purchase only
the goods with high priority, that is all goods in the interval [0, n(t)) and no goods in the
interval [n(t), N(t)]. In that case, innovators have a waiting time until consumers are willing
to purchase their product. Denoting this waiting time by &, the pro!t #ow $(N(t), %) is zero
at dates % ! [t, t+ &] , positive at all dates % ! (t+&, t+$], and zero for % > t+$. To see how
& is determined note that, when consumers start to buy good N(t) at date t + &, N(t) is the
good with least priority in the consumption bundle. Hence & is given by n(t+&) = N(t). In the
dynamic equilibrium n(t) grows at the constant rate g and we have n(t+ &) = n(t)e"g = N(t).
Innovation costs are constant over time and given by wF . Assuming free access to the
research sector, there is entry as long as innovation costs fall short of the value of an innovation.
Hence in equilibrium, when all pro!t opportunities are exploited, we must have wF $ #(t),
with strict equality whenever innovations take place. The zero-pro!t condition can be stated
as
wF =
! t+!
t+"
[p(N(t), %)" 1] c(N(t), %) e#r(##t)d% . (8)
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3.3 Optimal Savings
The representative consumer maximizes utility over an in!nite horizon. Assuming intertem-
poral separability of lifetime utility we can apply two-stage budgeting. This means we can
treat the dynamic problem (optimal allocation of lifetime expenditures across time) separately
from the static problem (optimal allocation of a given amount of expenditures across goods
at a given date). In Section 2 above we have studied the solution to the static problem. Now
we turn to the consumer’s dynamic problem. For the solution of this problem the following
Lemma is helpful.
Lemma 1 7! %'" 1%(%*& "80*.*6,*05 %'" 5(/*5*9"# *!1%(!%(!"$01 0%*.*%4 (% #(%" t: uˆ(t), &(! 6"
-,*%%"! (1 uˆ(t) = E(t)
1""
1#! K
/
n(t)
N(t) , p(t), a(t); s, "
0
.
Proof 1"" ;++"!#*/<
Note that the function K(.) in the Lemma depends on the fraction of consumed relative
to available goods n(t)/N(t), the innovators entry price p(t), and the fraction of competitive
sectors a(t). These variable can, in principle, change over time, which makes the analysis
potentially complicated. We are interested in a growth path that satis!es the Kaldor facts,
that is on a situation where expenditures and productivity (E(t) and N(t)) grow at the same
constant rate. In that case we know from equation (6) and (6’) that, in the respective regimes,
n(t)/N(t) and p(t) are constant over time. In addition, when N(t) grows at the constant rate
g, the fraction of competitive markets a(t) equals e#g! which is independent of t.11
Two-stage budgeting implies that, along the equilibrium growth path, the consumers’ static
and dynamic decisions can be conveniently separated. The static choices determine the equi-
librium value of the function K(.), taking E(t) as a constant, and the dynamic choice problem
is to decide on the time path of E(t), taking the equilibrium value of K(.) = K¯ as a constant.
The solution to the latter problem is equivalent to maximizing
U(t) = K¯
! "
t
-
E(%)1#!
1" "
.1#$
e#%(##t)
1" ' d%
11Ao 'ee (/e &e65(#on'/#4 \e(Leen a0 g, 5nT ", no(e (/5(0 5( T5(e t C" 566 45(en(' R&5n(eT 5( t 5nT \e+o&e
5&e eI4#&eT0 5nT 566 45(en(' R&5n(eT 5+(e& t 5&e no( )e( eI4#&eTM O#(/ N(t_ 35&Pe(' 5( T5(e t, (/e&e 5&e
N(tC"_ f eg!N(t_ 35&Pe(' 5( T5(e tC". <en.e0 5( T5(e tC", (/e 3e5'-&e o+ .o34e(#(#$e 35&Pe(' ec-56'
N(t_. V\$#o-'6)0 5 +&5.(#on a f e"g! #' .o34e(#(#$e 5nT 5 +&5.(#on 9" a f 9" e"g! #' 3ono4o6#'(#.M
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subject to the lifetime budget constraint! "
t
E(s)e#R(s)ds &
! "
t
w(s)e#R(s)ds+ V (t)
where ( is the rate of time preference, ' is a parameter that describes the willingness to shift
’utilities’ across periods,12 R(s) =
" s
t r(%)d% is the cumulative interest rate, and V (t) denotes
the assets that the consumer owns at date t.
The path of expenditures that maximizes the above objective function has to satisfy the
Euler equation
"E(t)
E(t)
= g =
r(t)" (
'(1" ") + " . (9)
Clearly, when E(t) grows at a constant rate, the interest rate r(t) is also constant. In the
symmetric case (" = 0) we get the usual form g = r#%$ . Note that the e!ect of " on the
growth rate of consumption is ambiguous (remember " < 1). A higher " raises g when ' > 1
and it decreases g if ' < 1. The intuition is subtle: With " > 0, the expenditures E(t) enter
themselves as a concave function in the utility function. The growth rate of consumption
depends on how fast marginal utility falls. In the symmetric case marginal utility declines at
rate '. The asymmetry has two e!ects. On the one hand, the *!%",temporal substitution e!ect
causes marginal utility to fall only at the rate '(1 " "); on the other side the *!%,(temporal
substitution implies that marginal utility falls at rate ". In total, marginal utility falls at rate
'(1" ") + " which is less than ' if ' > 1 and bigger than ' if ' < 1.
4 Long-Run Growth and Structural Change
We now describe the general equilibrium of the model. This equilibrium is characterized by the
co-existence of continuous structural change and a growth path that satis!es the Kaldor facts.
In this Section we de!ne the equilibrium growth path, establish the conditions under which a
unique path exists, and discuss the patterns of structural change along this path. Finally, the
critical role of the two preference parameteres, the saturation level s and the steepness of the
hierarchy " is studied.
12A/e &e5'on L/) Le (5Pe 4e&=4e&#oT -(#6#() (o (/e 4oLe& o+ # #' (/5( (/#' 566oL' -' (o 'e45&5(e (/e #n(&5= 5nT
#n(e&(e34o&56 '-\'(#(-(#onM S6(e&n5(#$e6)0 (/#nP o+ u(!c(i, $"_ 5' 5 .on'-34(#on 5RR&eR5(o& 5nT o+ u+{c+i,#},!!!
1"$
5' (/e #n'(5n(5neo-' -(#6#() +-n.(#onM
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4.1 De!nition of Equilibrium Growth Path
The equilibrium growth path is characterized by the following conditions: (i) consumers allo-
cate lifetime expenditures optimally across time and goods, (ii) !rms set prices that maximize
pro!ts, (iii) research !rms leave no pro!t opportunities unexploited, (iv) the labor force is
fully employed and (v) aggregate consumption and investment expenditures and the value of
aggregate production grow at the same rate.
When consumers do not purchase all available goods, n < N, conditions (i) and (ii) are
satis!ed when, for each date t, equations (9), (4) and (5) hold.13 Equation (9) implies that
consumer allocate expenditure optimally across time. If equations (4) and (5) are satis!ed
consumers allocate expenditures optimally across goods, given pro!t maximizing prices of !rms;
and !rms set pro!t-maximizing prices given the optimal quantities of consumers. Condition
(iii) is satis!ed when the resource constraint (7) holds, and condition (iv) is satis!ed when the
zero-pro!t equation (8) holds. Condition (v) is satis!ed because our speci!cation of preferences
boils down to a (maximized) felicity function that is CRRA in total consumption expenditures.
The critical underlying assumption is that the weighting factor is a power function !(i) = i#!
and that technologies are symmetric across industries.14
The model has a convenient recursive structure and we can reduce the above system of
equations to two equations in two unknows: the economy-wide growth rate g and the inno-
vator’s waiting time &. To obtain the !rst equation substitute equation (4) into the resource
constraint (7) and use the de!nition g =
N(t)
N(t) . Moreover we make use of the fact that in the
dynamic equilibrium we have n(t) = e#"gN(t) and aN(t) = N(t)e#!g. The former relation
says that the relation between consumed and available goods is constant and given by e#"g.
The latter relation says that the fraction of competitive markets among all markets is constant
13A/e (#3e #nTeI t en(e&' ec-5(#on' (D_ 5nT (`_ \e.5-'e n Te4enT' on t.
141n +5.(0 #( .5n \e '/oLn ('ee Hoe663#0 9JJJ_ (/5( #+ (#_ -(#6#() #' R#$en \)
" n
0
i""v(c(i__di0 (##_ (/e $5&#e(#e'
i # (:, n_ /5$e (/e '53e 4&oT-.(#on (e./no6oR) 5nT (###_ 5&e e#(/e& '-446#eT on 4e&+e.( o& 3ono4o6#'(#. 35&Pe('0
5n) -(#6#() +-n.(#on v(c(i__ (/5( '5(#'!e' v0 1 : 5nT v00 % : 6e5T' (o 5n ec-#6#\&#-3 '-./ (/5( (/e -(#6#() +-n.(#on
#' ;77S #n (/e .on'-3e&i' eI4enT#(-&e 6e$e6 L#(/ 45&53e(e& "M 8) (/#' Le 3e5n (/5( 35I#3#NeT -(#6#() #'
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and given by e#!g. Thus the resource constraint (7) can be rewritten as
1 = gF +
bs
2
e#g"
)
e#g(!#") " e
#g(1+!)(!#") + 1
1 + "
+ 1
,
. (10)
The second equation is obtained by substituting equations (9), (4) and (5) into the zero pro!t
condition (8). Here we note that from (4) c(N(t), %) = s2
1
1"
/
N(t)
N(#)
0!2
= s2
#
1" e#g!(##t)$
and from (5) p(N(t), %) = 12
1
1 +
/
N(#)
N(t)
0!2
= 12
#
1 + eg!(##t)
$
. This yields
wF =
s
4
*
1" e#&(!#")
)
" 21" e
#(&+g!)(!#")
)+ g"
+
1" e#(&+2g!)(!#")
)+ 2g"
+
# e#"(&+g!) (11)
where we used the de!nition ) = r " g" and the fact that from (9) r = (+ g('(1" ") + ").
Similarly, when consumers purchase all available goods, n = N, conditions (i) and (ii)
are satis!ed when equations (9), (4’) and (5’) hold; and conditions (iii) and (iv) are also
given by equations (7) and (8). This system of equations can be conveniently reduced to two
equation with two unknowns: the growth rate g and the innovator’s entry price p. The solution
procedure is analogous to before except that now (4’) and (5’) are relevant. This yields
1 = gF +
bs
2
)
e#g! " e
#g!(1+!) + 1
(1 + ") (2p" 1) + 1
,
(10’)
for the resource constraint, and
wF =
s
4
*
1" e#&!
)
(2p" 1)" 21" e
#(&+g!)!
)+ g"
+
1" e#(&+2g!)!
)+ 2g"
1
2p" 1
+
(11’)
for the zero-pro!t condition.
4.2 A Unique Equilibrium
To examine existence and uniqueness of the dynamic equilibrium we analyze the respective
equilibrium conditions graphically. We denote the resource constraint by R and the zero pro!t
condition by # and draw R and # in a (&, g, p)-diagram. This allows us to discuss the above
two scenarios simultaneously (Figure 1). In both parts of Figure 1 the vertical axis measures
the growth rate g. In the left part of Figure 1 the horizontal axis measures the innovator’s
waiting time & (from right to left, starting at & = 0), and in the right part of Figure 1 the
horizontal axis measures the innovators’ entry price p (starting at p = 1). Observe that & = 0
and p = 1 is the limiting case where the innovator has neither a waiting time nor enough
demand to charge a price above marginal cost.
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We now discuss the shape of the two curves in turn. To avoid confusion we denote the
resource constraint in (g, &)-space by R˜ and the one in (g, p)-space by R. Similarly, we have
# and #˜ for the zero-pro!t condition. The R-curve in (g, &) space is de!ned by the equation
1 = R˜(g, &) and R˜(g, &) is given by the right-hand-side of equation (10). The #-curve is de!ned
by the equation wF = #˜(g, &) where #˜(g, &) is given by the right-hand-side of equation (11).
Similarly, the R- and the #-curve in (g, p) space are de!ned by 1 = R(g, p) and wF = #(g, p)
where R(g, p) and #(g, p) by given by the right-hand-side of equations (10’) and (11’).
Figure 1
The shape of the #-curve Consider !rst the (g, &) space. When the consumer does not
buy all available goods, n < N, innovators have a waiting time & > 0 until they can sell their
product. The slope of the #˜-curve is given by dg/d& = "#˜"/#˜g. A higher & decreases pro!ts
so #˜" < 0 (where #˜x denotes the partial derivative of #˜ with respect to x). This simply results
from discounting: the longer one has to wait for a given pro!t #ow, the lower is the present
value of this #ow. This e!ect is enhanced by the fact that, due to a !xed patent duration $,
the period during which the innovator earns positive pro!ts does not only start later but also
becomes shorter (recall that we measure & from left to right).
The impact of the growth rate g on the value of an innovation #, i.e. the of #˜g is am-
biguous. In a world with homothetic preferences where all goods enter the utility function in
a symmetric way, a higher growth rate always lowers the value of an innovation. This is be-
cause in equilibrium, a higher growth rate is always associated with a higher interest rate that
discounts future revenues more strongly (see the discussion in Romer, 1990). With hierarchic
preferences instead, we have a second e!ect: a higher growth rate raises demand for the most
recent innovator’s product and leads to faster growth of the innovator’s market. This leads to
higher future prices and higher future pro!ts which raises the value of an innovation. The size
of the latter e!ect depends crucially on the value of ", the steepness of the hierarchy: Lemma
2 below shows that the !rst e!ect always dominates if " is low. Instead, if the hierarchy pa-
rameter " is large, the demand e!ect of higher growth dominates the interest rate e!ect at low
level of g (see Figure 1). It is important to note that a steep hierarchy is a necessary condition
for the regime n < N to be possible at all. When innovators have no initial demand, there are
innovation incentives only if, after the waiting period &, demand grows very quickly.
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When consumers purchase all available products, n = N, innovators have no waiting time
& = 0 and charge an entry price larger than marginal cost p $ 1. The slope of the #-curve is
given by dg/dp = "#p/#g. How does the value of an innovation depend on p? We know from
(5’) that a higher entry price p for the most recent innovator’s product means higher prices for
all other goods in equilibrium. Moreover, from equation (4’) a higher p is also associated with
larger equilibrium consumption of each variety. Hence each monopolist has larger pro!ts, so
we have #p > 0.
The impact of the growth rate g on the value of an innovation is just like before. The
demand e!ect increases, whereas the interest e!ect decreases the value of an innovation. The
demand e!ect can dominate at low growth rates when the hierarchy is steep enough, whereas
the interest e!ect dominates at high growth rates.
Lemma 2 (< ='" 9",$ +,$!% &$!#*%*$! &,$11"1 %'" p2(/*1 (% pZ = 1+
/
(1 + bsF
1#e"!%
% )
1
2 " 1
0#1
6< ='" 3(.0" $> (! *!!$3(%*$! >(..1 5$!$%$!*&(..4 *! %'" ),$-%' ,(%" *> " & $(p)#1)1+$(p)#1) (#at
hierarchy). 7! %'*1 &(1": %'" 9",$ +,$!% &$!1%,(*!% *1 ( 5$!$%$!*&(..4 *!&,"(1*!) &0,3" *! %'"
(g, p)21+(&"<
&< ?$, g 10!&*"!%.4 '*)': #g < 0 (!# #˜g < 0.
Proof 1"" ;++"!#*/<
The shape of the R-curve The slope of the resource constraint R can be derived in an
analogous way as before by calculating, respectively, dg/d& = "R˜"/R˜g and dg/dp = "Rp/Rg
for the two regimes. A higher waiting time & reduces labor demand. The reason is that a higher
& decreases the demand for each product. (To see this use n = e#"gN in equation (4)). This
means that R˜" < 0. Similarly, a higher entry price p is associated with higher consumption
levels for all goods (see equation (4’)), and thus with a larger demand for labor in the whole
economy. For this reason Rp > 0.
A higher growth rate g has an ambiguous e!ect on the demand for labor resources. On the
one hand, there is the direct e!ect from a larger demand for workers in the research sector.
On the other hand, there is an indirect e!ect which is due to the increase in the size of the
monopolistic sector. (Recall from Section 3 above that, with a given patent duration $, a
fraction e#g! of all goods is supplied by competitive producers and a fraction 1 " e#g! by
monopolistic !rms). The larger the monopolistic sector, the higher the overall price level, and
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the lower consumption demand. Hence an increase in g leads to a lower demand for production
workers. The following Lemma shows that the latter e!ect may dominate at low g, whereas
the former e!ect always dominates at high g. We therefore have Rg > 0 if g is high and vice
versa. We summarize this discussion in the following
Lemma 3 (< ='" ,"1$0,&" &$!1%,(*!% &,$11"1 %'" p2(/*1 (% pR =
1
2
1
1 + 11+!
bs
bs#1
2
*> 1 < bs &
1+!
! <
6< 7> bs & 1, %'" ,"1$0,&" &$!1%,(*!% *1 5$!$%$!*&(..4 >(..*!) *! %'" (g, p)2 (!# (&, g)21+(&"
(!# ,"(&'"1 (145+%$%*&(..4 %'" ),$-%' ,(%" gˆ *5+.*&*%.4 #"!!"# 64 1 = gˆF + bs2
'
1 + e#gˆ!
(
.
&< 7> bs > 1+!! , "3"! (% g = 0 !$% (.. +,$#0&%1 &(! 6" +,$#0&"#: %'" 1'(," $> +,$#0&%1
&$!105"# x = nN *1 %'"! )*3"! 64 %'" "80(%*$! 1 =
bs
2
1
1" x#! 11+! + x !1+!
2
.
#< ?$, g 10!&*"!%.4 '*)': Rg > 0 (!# R˜g > 0.
Proof 1"" ;++"!#*/<
Remark 7> bs & 1, %'" R"&0,3" !"3", '*%1 %'" p"(/*1< ;.. &$!105",1 &$0.# &$!105" (..
3(,*"%*"1 (% %'" 1(%0,(%*$! ."3". (!# %'"," (," 1%*.. ,"1$0,&"1 (3(*.(6." >$, ,"1"(,&'<
Having discussed the shapes of the two curves we can consider the general equilibrium
of the model. In this equilibrium both the resource constraint and the zero pro!t condition
have to be satis!ed which is the case at the point of intersection E in Figure 1.15 A su"cient
condition for uniqueness is " & $(p)#1)1+$(p)#1) (#at hierarchy) and bs & 1, since then the two
equilibrium curves are monotonically increasing or falling, respectively.
Proposition 1 (< 7> %'" "/$)"!$01 +(,(5"%",1 1(%*1>4 pZ < pR $, *> bs & 1: %'"," "/*1%1 (
)"!",(. "80*.*6,*05 -*%' +$1*%*3" ),$-%' ,(%"<
6< ; 10!&*"!% &$!#*%*$! >$, ( 0!*80" )"!",(. "80*.*6,*05 *1 bs & 1 (!# " & $(p)#1)1+$(p)#1) <
Proof @(,% 6< 1"" ;++"!#*/<
Corollary ='" )"!",(. "80*.*6,*05 *1 &$!1*1%"!% -*%' %'" A(.#$, >(&%1B ='" ),$-%' ,(%": %'"
*!%","1% ,(%": (!# %'" .(6$, 1'(," (," &$!1%(!%<
From the Euler equation (9) constant growth implies a constant interest rate. The labor
share remains unchanged since wages grow with the same rate as output.
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4.3 Structural Change
The equilibrium growth path exhibits &$!%*!0$01 1%,0&%0,(. &'(!)"B At a given date, many
di!erent goods exist and each good has a di!erent income elasticity. Declining sectors with
a low income elasticity and a falling share of production and employment co-exist with ex-
panding sectors that have a high income elasticity and expanding share of production and
employment. Hence there is uneven development and continuous reallocation of labor across
sectors of production. In this Section we describe the pattern of structural change in more
detail. We will concentrate on the regime n < N and brie#y discuss the regime n = N at the
end of the section.
To make the changes in the structure of consumption and employment explicit consider
the life cycle of product i. How does demand and employment of an innovator increase over
time? To answer this question take equation (4) and note that along the long-run growth path
we have n(t) = e#"gN(t). Given the initial value of N, the growth rate g, and the innovator’s
waiting time &, we know the equilibrium value of n(t). From equation (4) the consumption
level c(i, t) and the corresponding level of employment l(i, t) = b c(i,t)N(t) can be calculated.
Figure 2 shows the Engel-curves for good i = N(t). We draw c(i, t) against total output
in the production sector E(t). As E(t), N(t), and n(t) grow at the same rate the shape of
the Engel-curve can be derived from (4). Demand is initially zero and the non-negativity
constraints are still binding. This means at low income levels consumers cannot a!ord the
product. Once a critical income level has been reached consumers start to buy. Increases in
income initially lead to a strong expansion of the market, followed by decreasing growth rates
and !nally stagnating demand in the long term once consumption approaches the saturation
level s. We note further that Engel-curves show a discontinuity at the point of time when
patents expire. At this date the market opens up for competition, the price falls to marginal
cost, and the demand level jumps up.
Figure 2
The following proposition summarizes the patterns of structural change by referring to the
income elasticities of demand and employment. The ’gross’ income elasticities take account of
both the direct income e!ect on demand and of the indirect e!ects due to changes in the own
price and the prices of all other (monopolistically supplied) products as incomes grow.
20
Proposition 2 () ='" D),$11D *!&$5" ".(1%*&*%4 $> #"5(!# >$, )$$# i *1 " s#c(i,t)c(i,t) .
6) ='" D),$11D *!&$5" ".(1%*&*%4 >$, "5+.$45"!% *1 " s#c(i,t)c(i,t) " 1<
This proposition holds for both regimes. As E(t), N(t) and n(t) grow at the same rate, we
can calculate the income elasticity as dc(i,t)dn(t)
n(t)
c(i,t) or
dc(i,t)
dN(t)
N(t)
c(i,t) . For both regimes, the expressions
in the proposition can be derived, respectively, from equations (4) and (4’). Part b) of the
proposition obtains because the employment required to produce c(i, t) is l(i, t) = b c(i,t)N(t) , hence
dl(i,t)
dN(t)
N(t)
l(i,t) =
dc(i,t)
dN(t)
N(t)
c(i,t) " 1.
The above proposition shows that, for a given product, the demand elasticity is initially
high and then decreases monotonically towards zero as consumption approaches the saturation
level s.16 E"1+*%" %'(% %'" 5$#". )"!",(%"1 &$!1%(!% ),$-%' ,(%"1 $> 5(&,$"&$!$5*& ()),")(%"1:
)$$#1 -*%' '*)' (!# .$- *!&$5" ".(1%*&*%*"1 &$"/*1% (!# &$!%*!0$01 1%,0&%0,(. &'(!)" %(F"1 +.(&"<
We make two further interesting observations. The !rst refers to the de!nition of luxury
versus necessary goods. In order to determine whether a good is a necessity or a luxury one
frequently refers to the income elasticity of a product. Luxury goods are goods with a high
income elasticity (higher than unity), whereas necessities are goods with a low income elasticity.
The above proposition shows that, whether or not a good is a luxury or a necessity, depends
on the level of development. Income elasticities change as the economy gets richer, and a good
that has been a luxury good in the initial period of the product cycle becomes a necessity after
incomes have su"ciently grown.
The second interesting observation refers to typical patterns of industry demand. Many
writers have suggested that a stylized path of industry demand imply an Engel curve that has
a logisitic shape (for an explicit treatment see, for instance, Pasinetti, 1981). Initially demand
is low and it also expands slowly. In this initial stage industry growth rates increase, reach a
maximum and then start to decrease again. For Figue 2 above we see that, for a single product
such a pattern emerges with the exception that the slowly growing initial stage is not present.
However, when we consider a ,(!)" $> +,$#0&%1 (an ’industry’), increasing income e!ects in the
early stage of the product cycle are generated because demand increases both at the intensive
and at the extensive margin. As incomes grow consumers purchase more of the same products
16S6'o L#(/ &e'4e.( (o Te35nT e65'(#.#(#e' no(e (/e T#'.on(#n-#() 5( (/e T5(e L/en 45(en(' eI4#&eM S( (/#'
T5(e (/e Te35nT 6e$e6 j-34' -4 5nT (/-' (/e&e #' 5 '-TTen Te.&e5'e #n (/e #n.o3e e65'(#.#()M
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as well as new products. After a critical income level has been reached all products have
positive demand, income e!ects decrease, and once incomes have su"ciently grown demand
approaches the saturation level. Panel a) of Figure 3 simulates industry demand and shows
that industry Engel-curves have logistic shape.
Figure 3
In panel b) of Figure 3 we show the corresponding development of industry employment.
Whether or not employment increases or decreases, depends on whether demand grows faster or
slower than productivity. Hence the employment level re#ects the outcome of a race between
the growth of demand and productivity as the economy gets richer. Initially the growth
of demand is larger than the growth of productivity and employment increases over time.
However, after incomes have su"ciently grown, the growth of market demand lags behind
the growth of productivity. Hence the industry labor share decreases. We also note that the
discontinuities in product and labor demand due to expired patents smooth out as we consider
a whole range of products rather than a single variety. We summarize our discussion in the
following
Proposition 3 ='" G!)". &0,3" >$, ( ,(!)" $> +,$#0&%1 '(1 ( .$)*1%*& 1'(+": (!# %'" &$,,"2
1+$!#*!) G!)". &0,3" $> "5+.$45"!% *1 6"..21'(+"#<
4.4 The Impact of Hierarchic Preferences
The assumptions which are crucial for the results of this model refer to the preference side.
We have already mentioned the importance of the hierarchy function !(i) = i#! to generate
constant growth rates for macroeconomic aggregates. We now consider the two parameters
that characterize the hierarchy of needs, the steepness " and the saturation level s.
The impact on growth An *!&,"(1" *! %'" '*",(,&'4 +(,(5"%", " has two competing e!ects
on growth (Figure 4). On the one side, a higher " raises both prices and demanded quantities.
The resulting higher pro!ts tend to increase the incentive to innovate and raise growth. The
zero-pro!t curve # shifts to the left. On the other side, with a steeper hierarchy more labor
is used in production because a higher " increases the demand for each good. This raises the
demand for production labor and leaves less resources for innovation and growth. The resource
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constraint R shifts to the left. In general, either e!ect can dominate so we can conclude that
the steepness of the hierarchy " has no systematic e!ect on growth.
However, a rise in " clearly implies that the innovator’s waiting time & increases (regime
n < N) or that the innovators’ entry price p falls (regime n = N). This should come to no
surprise, as with a steeper hierarchy ", the low-i goods get more weight in the utility function.
Thus the utility drawn from consuming many di!erent goods - the love for variety - becomes
less pronounced.
Figure 4
The e!ects of ( '*)'", 1(%0,(%*$! ."3". s are similar to those of a higher ". As s rises, the
demand for each good increases (see equations (4) and (4’)). This raises the pro!tability of
an innovation and the #-curve shifts to the left. But obviously the demand change leads also
to an increase in the demand for production labor and leaves less resources for research. As a
result, the resource constraint R also shifts to the left. Just like an increase in ", a larger s has
no systematic e!ect on the growth rate g but leads to an increase in the innovator’s waiting
time & (when n < N) or to lower prices p (when n = N).
The analysis above suggests that we can interpret s and " as parameters for ’variety-
aversion’. This becomes clear when we look at the utility function (1). For a given s, the
steepness of the hierarchy says how much weight a certain product gets in the objective function
and if " is larger, the most basic goods get disproportionately high importance. For a given
", the parameter s is a scaling factor, which determines how many units of good i are to be
consumed to achieve a certain utility level. As marginal utility is falling, a large s is equivalent
to a slowly falling marginal utility. A consumer does not want to consume a lot of a given
product does not want to consume many di!erent goods, in this sense a low s reinforces a
given variety-aversion as measured by ".
The impact on patterns of structural change The preference parameters determine the
extent of structural change both directly and indirectly via the growth rate. Below, we will
focus on the direct e!ect and ask how do the hierarchy parameter " and the saturation level
s a!ect the patterns of structual change, )*3"! %'" "80*.*6,*05 3(.0"1 $> g (!# & ($, p)< Of
course, the growth rate itself is crucial for structural change. If growth is higher, expenditures
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rise faster, hence we see from Figure 4 that the velocity of structural change is increased.
Without growth no structural change takes place at all.
If the hierarchy is steep, " is high, the gross income elasticity implies that demand increases
strongly and approaches the saturation level quickly. In this sense, we have a lot of structural
change. Intuitively, a steeper hierarchy implies a shift of demand away from the most recent
(and least priority) goods to necessities. To see this more clearly, consider the other extreme,
when no hierarchy exists and " = 0. Here structural change is reduced to a minimum: with
symmetry across products, the demand for an innovator jumps to its steady-state level at
the period when the product is introduced and stays at this level forever. (The ’gross’ income
elasticity of demand is equal to zero). The whole increase in income takes place at the extensive
margin: an increase in consumption means purchasing new goods whereas the consumption
level of the old goods is not a!ected. Reallocation of labor takes the form of a proportional
reduction of labor in the existing !rms which are employed in the new !rms. When " > 0
the consumption level of all sectors is a!ected and the reallocation of labor a!ects sectors
di!erently. Sectors with a ’gross’ income elasticity larger than unity attract workers from
sectors with an elasticity lower than unity. Additional income is to a smaller extent directed
towards new goods.
The saturation level s only scales up demand but has otherwise no e!ect on the patterns of
structural change. Inserting (4) into " s#c(i,t)c(i,t) , we directly see that s does not a!ect the gross
elasticity of demand.
5 Multiple Equilibria
If the parameter values satisfy pZ $ pR a 1%()!(%*$! equilibrium or 50.%*+." equilibria may
arise (see Lemmas 2 and 3 for the de!nitions of pZ and pR). In that case, the #-curve cuts
the p-axis to the right of the R-curve.
Stagnation In a stagnation equilibrium the value of an innovation is (equal or) 15(..",
than the costs of an innovation, which implies that no research will be undertaken. Not
surprisingly, this outcome is likely if research costs F are high. Also in the stagnatory state,
the full employment condition has to be satis!ed, hence the equilibrium point lies $! the R-
curve and is located where the R-curve intersects the horizontal axis (at g = 0). If n = N , the
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R-curve hits the horizontal axis in the right part of Figure 1. This occurs at pR > 1. When
this inequality is violated the regime n = N is not feasible and we are in the regime n < N .
As the economy does not grow, the waiting time & is not a meaningful endogenous variable
because & will necessarily be in!nite. As stated in Lemma 3c, the resource constraint has to
be solved for x = n/N , the share of available products that is actually consumed. In such an
equilibrium there are !rms that know how to produce the goods i ! (n,N ], but no production
ever takes place since demand given the (constant) income level is too small.
Multiple equilibria If pZ $ pR and if the two curves cross the model exhibits multiple equi-
libria. We then have three equilibria: the stagnation point and the two points of intersection
of the #- and the R-curve. There are two potential sources of multiplicity: the !rst is due to
!!*%" +(%"!% ."!)%'; the second is due to ( '*",(&'*& 1%,0&%0," $> +,">","!&"1. To identify the
critical assumptions we compare the behavior of an economy where consumers have symmetric
preferences (" = 0) to the case when preferences are hierarchic (" > 0).
Figure 5
I*%' 1455"%,*& +,">","!&"1 ( " = 0) each good faces the same demand, hence all monopo-
listic prices are equal to p > 1. A situation where p = 1 and & > 0 cannot arise in an equilibrium
with positive growth since a new good is *55"#*(%".4 purchased in the same amounts as all
other goods supplied by the monopolists. The zero pro!t condition and the resource constraint,
respectively, read
F
bs
=
1" e#&!
)
(p" 1)2
2p" 1 , and 1 = gF + bs
'
1 + e#g!
( p" 1
2p" 1 .
The slope of the zero pro!t condition is positive because a demand externality does not arise:
higher economy-wide growth has no impact on the market demand for previous innovators.
Instead demand jumps from zero to a positive level and stays there until the patent has
expired.17 Hence there is always a positive association between the entry price p and the
growth rate g.
The resource constraint, however, still has an ambiguous slope. A higher growth g not only
raises the demand for labor in research but it also decreases the demand for production labor.
17A/e&e5+(e& Te35nT 35Pe' 5 +-&(/e& j-34 T-e (o (/e +566 #n 4&#.e' (/5( o..-&' 5' 'oon 5' (/e .o34e(#(#$e
4&oT-.e&' (5Pe o$e& (/e 35&Pe(k neeT6e'' (o '5)0 (/#' Te35nT #n.&e5'e #' #&&e6e$5n( +o& (/e #nno$5(#on' #n.en(#$e'
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The larger fraction of monopolistic markets implies high prices on more markets leading to
lower aggregate consumption demand. High growth can be sustained due to lower equilibrium
employment in production and vice versa. When patent length is *!!!*%", this complementarity
vanishes. In that case changes in the growth rate do not a!ect market structure because all
markets are monopolized. This point has been made by Laussel and Nyssen (1999) who showed
that multiple equilibria can arise in a standard endogenous growth model when patent length
is !nite.
I*%' '*",(,&'*& +,">","!&"1 (" > 0) the situation is di!erent. Multiple equilibria can arise
even when there are in!nitely lived patents because the #-curve is not necessarily monotonic.
With a steep hierarchy (high ") the #-curve is backward bending at low levels of g (see Lemma
2b). The reason is a demand externality: when preferences have a hierarchic structure the de-
mand of a previous innovator depends on the economy-wide growth rate. If innovators expect
high growth they expect that the demand for their products expands more quickly so that
future prices, quantities, and pro!ts are larger. So higher economy-wide growth stimulates
the incentive to innovate. If innovators expect low growth, pro!t expectations and the result-
ing incentives to innovate are correspondingly low. Hence low growth rates are sustained by
pessimistic expectations and vice versa. Obviously, this #"5(!# "/%",!(.*%4 is at work inde-
pendently of the particular length of a patent; in particular it holds even when protection is
forever.18
It is worth noting that the intercept of the resource constraint with the horizontal axis, pR,
shifts to the left with an increase in ". According to Proposition 1, this implies that multiple
equilibria become more likely. We summarize this discussion in the following
Proposition 4 ; '*",(,&'*& 1%,0&%0," $> +,">","!&"1 ( " > 0) 5(4 ."(# %$ 50.%*+." "80*.*6,*(
"3"! -'"! +(%"!% ."!)%' *1 *!!!*%"<
18S '#3#65& 3e./5n#'3 #' 4&e'en( #n (/e 3oTe6 o+ ,Le#3@-66e& (G:::_M A/#' 454e& '(-T#e' (/e #345.( o+
#nec-56#() on (/e 5RR&eR5(e #nno$5(#on &5(eM 1n (/5( 3oTe60 .on'-3e&' \-) one -n#( o+ e5./ 4&oT-.( 5nT 5
Te35nT e!e.( o+ /#R/e& R&oL(/ &5(e' 5&#'e' \e.5-'e (/e L5#(#nR (#3e o+ (/e #nno$5(o& +o& (/e Te35nT o+ (/e
4oo& \e.o3e' '/o&(e&M A/e 5''-34(#on' #n (/5( 3oTe6 5&e 3o&e &e'(&#.(#$e (/5n #n (/e 4&e'en( 3oTe6B .on'-3e&'
\-) on6) one -n#( o+ e5./ RooT0 5nT (/e 35&P=-4 o+ 5n #nno$5(o& #' 5''-3eT (o \e eIoReno-'M
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6 An Application to Optimal Patent Duration
Patent policy always faces a tradeo!. On the one hand, patents create mark-ups and these
mark-ups distort relative prices. On the other hand, patents stimulate R&D by allowing the
successful !rms to earn pro!ts which may imply a dynamic e"ciency gain. In a symmetric
world this tradeo! is trivial as there are no relative price distortions when patent length is
in!nite (see also the discussion in O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller, 1998). As long as innovators
are not displaced by future innovators (as in models of expanding product variety) it is optimal
to set the patent length to in!nity. With hierarchic preferences instead such price distortions
exist as the mark-ups of innovators increase over time.
In such a set-up it is interesting to study the question whether a higher utility level can be
achieved by !nite patents. Proposition 5 says that social welfare can always be increased by
moving from in!nite to !nite patent duration.
Proposition 5 I".>(," *1 5(/*5*9"# (% ( !!*%" +(%"!% ."!)%'<
Proof 1"" ;++"!#*/<
The result in Proposition 5 does !$% depend on the rate of time preference. Intuitively, the
static ine"ciency of the price distortions is always too strong to make an in!nite patent length
socially optimal. To illustrate this result graphically, we have plotted the value of intertemporal
utility for di!erent hierarchy levels in dependency of the inverse patent duration 1/$, so that
a value of zero for this variable corresponds to in!nite patent length (Figure 6). We see that
social welfare increases at 1/$ = 0 but the dynamic e"ciency loss as a result of lower R&D
ultimately dominates the static e"ciecy gain from the reduction of price distortions of shorter
patents.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the optimal patent length becomes shorter as
the hierarchy gets steeper. Intuitively, a steeper hierarchy implies stronger price distortions
and bigger static ine"ciency. For the parameter values chosen in Figure 6, the optimal patent
length is about 18 years when " = 0.7.
Figure 6
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7 Conclusions and Extensions
We have presented a model that captures two of the most important features of the long-run
growth process: the dramatic changes in the structure of production and employment; and
the Kaldor facts of economic growth. Our model has focused on the demand-explanation of
structural change according to which the dramatic reallocation of labor is driven by di!erences
in income elasticities across sectors. The basic idea of our analysis is that household expand
their consumption along a hierarchy of needs. If the ’hierarchy function’ that characterizes the
willingsness of consumers to move from goods with high priority to goods with lower priority
takes a particular form, the equilibrium process of growth and structural change is consistent
with the Kaldor facts.
Innovations play a crucial role in our model. Innovations drive productivity growth and
this leads to interesting interactions between sectoral and aggregate dynamics: Economy-
wide growth prospects are of central importance for the emergence of new industries; and the
industrial R&D that leads to these new industries is central for improvements in productivity.
These complementarities open up the possibility for multiple equilibria. Hence our model is
not only capable of yielding insights into the process of growth and structural change, but
sheds also light on the question why some countries experience high long-term growth and
many industries take o!, while in other countries we see neither a change in the production
structure nor increases in aggregate productivity.
The way we have discussed the interactions between structural change and economic growth
depends on several assumptions and suggests interesting extensions. We want to mention
four points. First, our discussion of the model was based on a particular endogenous growth
mechanism. However, our main results do not depend on a speci!c mechanism that drives
aggregate productivity. For instance, an exogenous growth mechanism would reproduce similar
patterns of structural change as presented in this paper,19 as would a semi-endogenous growth
model in the spirit of Jones (1995) that does not exhibit the scale e!ects that characterizes the
present model. Instead, removing the scale e!ect by introducing a quality dimension (as in the
models survey by Jones, 1999) would add a qualitatively new feature to our model. Structural
change could also take place within industries as better goods would replace old goods and
19V+ .o-&'e0 eIoReno-' R&oL(/ Lo-6T on6) 566oL +o& 5 one=L5) .5-'56#() +&o3 5RR&eR5(e (o 'e.(o&56 T)n53#.'
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incumbent !rms may either change their own structure of production or may be displaced by
new !rms supplying better qualities at lower prices.
Second, our results are based on the assumption that the baseline utility function is
quadratic. We have used this speci!c formulation because it illustrates the idea that con-
sumers get saturated with goods of high priority and move on to goods with lower priority.
However, it can be shown (Foellmi, 1999) that this speci!c formulation of the baseline utility is
not crucial. In fact, to reconcile structural changes with the Kaldor facts, any baseline utility
function satisfying the usual assumptions works. What is important, however, is that hierarchy
function takes a particular form; and that supply conditions are symmetric across sectors (or
keep the same relative structure).
A third point concerns the obvious extension of the model to study the role of income
*!"80(.*%4. Since hierarchic preferences are non-homothetic, rich and poor households will con-
sume di!erent consumption bundles. This opens up a new channel by which income inequality
could a!ect innovation and growth. In that case the pricing decisions of !rms with market
power depend on the income distribution and these decisions determine whether or not certain
groups are excluded from the consumption of certain products (Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller, 2002).
Finally, hierarchic preferences in a world economy with rich and poor countries would imply
interesting patterns of *!%",!(%*$!(. %,(#" and growth. First, it is a natural way of modelling
the Linder-hypothesis (Linder, 1961) and/or the product-cycle hypothesis (Vernon, 1979). A
rich country faces high home-demand and hence will innovate early. The poor country will !rst
import new goods, but later on start to imitate. Hence rich countries will produce !"- goods
with a high income elasticity and poor countries will produce $.# goods with a low elasticity.
Second, our set-up is also useful to shed light on the Prebisch/Singer-hypothesis (Prebisch,
1950, Singer, 1950) according to which the terms of trade for the poor countries deteriorate as
their exports are concentrated on goods with low income elasticities.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium values of the growth rate g and waiting time δ 
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Figure 2: The Engel-curve for good i = N(t) 
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Figure 3: Output and Employment Share of an Industry 
 
Industry Range: [n, kn] 
 
Parameter Values: 
n = s = 1, k = 3, γ = 0.7, δ = 0, Δ = ∞ 
 
Expenditures E, when good i = n starts production, are normalized to 1. 
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Figure 4: A rise in γ 
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Figure 5: Multiple Equilibria 
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Figure 6: The impact of different patent durations on welfare 
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